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5. The Accommodation Doctrine
What are Louisiana's Neighbors
Doing and Why Should Louisiana Care?
Joshua A. Norris
Lemle & Kelleher, LLP
Houston, Texas
I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is not to provide an exhaustive discussion
of the details of any one state's legal landscape as it relates to the
sometimes heated and always changing relationship between surface
estate owners and mineral owners. Rather, the purpose of this paper is to
set the stage for a meaningful exchange of information, ideas, and
strategy regarding what the current landscape around Louisiana's borders
looks like and why those that live, work, and, probably most importantly
for our purposes, operate in the state should care about what their
neighbors are doing on these issues. In sum, what, if anything, can
Louisiana learn from its neighbors' struggles with the same issues?
To serve those stated purposes, this article, after providing a brief
background for context, examines how Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, and
Oklahoma have dealt with and are dealing with the accommodation of, or
lack thereof, the :;urface estate by the mineral owners. Specifically, the
article covers for each state the latest on (1) surface use disputes and (2)
surface restoration issues and trends.
II. Background
Historically, the mineral estate was considered the dominant estate
vith the surface estate as servient. The reasons behind such a rule was
that the mineral estate is rendered virtually useless without access to and
the opportunity to extract minerals. Thus, without a contract in place to
provide otherwise, the mineral owner had been traditionally able to use
as much of the surface as was reasonably necessary to access the mineral
estate in producing the minerals. The focus of this "reasonably
necessary" doctrine was on whether the mineral owner's use was
reasonable or, on the other hand, excessive or negligent.'
Such a mechanism for refereeing the relationship between the
mineral and surface owners supplied plenty of opportunity for disputes,
with most focusing on two related issues: (1) whether the mineral
owner's operations and use of the surface in finding and extracting the
minerals were reasonable; and (2) whether the effects of the mineral
owner's operations and use of the surface had to be repaired and to what
standard. Generally, the "reasonably necessary" doctrine answered those
I Hunt Oil Co. v. Kerbaugh, 283 N.W.2d 131, 136 (N.D. 1979).
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questions by focusing on whether the mineral owner was reasonable in
its conduct, no matter the effect on the surface owner's use of his estate.'
As exploration and production became more widespread and
showed up closer to "civilization," the strength of the mineral owner's
dominance began to erode. Texas was on the forefront of this debate with
an appellate court's decision in Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, a case that marks
the shift in focus from what is "reasonably necessary" for the mineral
owner to an examination that seeks to weigh the benefits and injuries to
both the mineral and the surface owner.' With the introduction of Getty,
gone were the days, at least in Texas, of a mineral owner simply showing
that it acted reasonably. Rather, under this Accommodation Doctrine (or
"Due Regard" Doctrine), the mineral owner now has to tackle a court's
analysis that includes effects on both parties - mineral owner and surface
owner.
At least one commentator, Professor Bruce Kramer, has perhaps
more appropriately described this debate as between the "uni-
dimensional" approach, with its focus solely on the reasonableness of the
mineral owner's operations, and the "multi-dimensional" approach, with
its focus on balancing the "benefits and injuries to both sides to
determine whether a particular use of the surface should be allowed or
modified or conditioned because it conflicts with, or causes injury to, the
owner of the surface estate."4
No matter what we call the debate, every state with operations that
include the exploration and production of oil and/or gas has or is dealing
with how this debate plays out, including Louisiana and its neighbors.
The purpose of the following discussion is to note briefly where
Louisiana's neighboring states of Texas, Arkansas, Mississippi, and
Oklahoma stand on these issues in an effort to then discuss why and what
Louisiana should learn from those states' experiences.
III. Texas
In Getty Oil Co. v. Royal, the mineral estate owner sued to enjoin
the surface owner from building fences and gates on an oil and gas lease
that were interfering with Getty Oil's ability to operate its lease.5 The
trial court instructed the jury that the surface owner had a right to erect
such fences and gates if it did not unreasonably interfere with the mineral
owner's use of the roads to operate the lease.' The jury found that the
gates did not unreasonably interfere with the operations, and the
2 Id.
3 422 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
4 Bruce M. Kramer, The Legal Framework for Analyzing Multiple Surface Use
Issues, 2005 No. I ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. PAPER.
s 422 S.W.2d at 592.
6 Id.
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appellate court, after explaining that the mineral estate is dominant,
found that the jury instruction was proper where the surface owner's use
of the property was significantly affected while the mineral owner's use
was one of slight inconvenience.' Having to get out of a vehicle to
unlock gates numerous times did not surpass the surface owner's harm
caused by trespassers on the property.!
This case set up the Supreme Court of Texas' decision in Getty Oil
Co. v. Jones a few years later.' This time, however, the surface owner
brought suit to enjoin the mineral estate owner from using the vertical
surface space for pumping units that interfered with his use of tall
irrigating towers.o After paying lip-service to the "reasonably necessary
doctrine," the court held that the effects of the mineral owner's uses of
the property on the surface owner's use must be taken into consideration
and stated:
The due regard concept defines more fully what is to be considered
in the determination of whether a surface use by the lessee is
reasonably necessary. There may be only one manner of use of the
surface wheieby the minerals can be produced. The lessee has the
right to purue this use, regardless of surface damage. Kenny v.
Texas Gulf S'ulphur Co., 351 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1961, writ ref'd). And there may be necessitous temporary use
governed by the same principle. But under the circumstances
indicated here; i.e., where there is an existing use by the surface
owner which would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where
under the established practices in the industry there are alternatives
available to the lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the
rules of reascnable usage of the surface may require the adoption of
an alternative by the lessee."
In Valence Operating Co. v. Genco L.P., another Texas appellate
court very recentlyi emphasized the Texas law requirement to balance the
interests of the mineral owner and the surface owner:'
The dominant mineral estate has the right to reasonable use of the
surface estate to produce minerals, but this right is to be exercised
with due regard for the rights of the surface estate's owner. This
concept of 'due regard,' known as the accommodation doctrine, was
first articulated in Getty Oil and balances the rights of the surface
owner and the mineral owner in the use of the surface.
Id.
Id.
9 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974).
10 Id. at 619-20.
" Id. at 622.
12 2008 WL 553220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco, February 27, 2008).
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The court went on to further explain that where the mineral owner
has but one use to produce the minerals, he has the right to that use
regardless of surface damages." But, if alternative uses of the surface
exist, one of which permits the surface owner to continue to use the
surface in the manner intended, then the mineral owner must use the
alternative that allows such continued use."
Finally, and importantly, to enjoin the mineral owner, the surface
owner has the burden to prove: (1) the particular manner of surface use
being challenged is not reasonably necessary to the mineral owner's
operations, which may be proved by showing the mineral owner has
other available means of production that would not interfere with the
surface owner's existing use; and (2) any other uses of the surface are
impracticable and unreasonable under the circumstances."
Plaintiff Genco used coal from a nearby mine to produce electricity
to run its limestone plant, which produced coal combustion products. 6
Genco disposed of those by-products in a landfill for which Valence is
the mineral estate owner." Vilence's operations included drilling two
wells on the landfill's footprint that were permitted by the Texas
Railroad Commission." Those two wells prevented Genco from being
able to use that part of the landfill for its operations of disposing of the
coal combustion products, and Genco sued to enjoin *Valence from
drilling the two wells." Based on instructions consistent with the court's
explanation of the accommodation doctrine in Texas, a jury returned a
verdict in favor of Genco based on a finding that Genco had no other
practicable and reasonable use of the surface other than as a landfill,
which the appellate court affirmed.20
As Texas courts have moved away from the reasonably necessary
doctrine to the due regard analysis, and thus in favor of surface owners,
the same courts, on the other hand, have protected mineral owners when
it comes to surface restoration disputes. First, no implied duty to restore
the surface exists in Texas.2' Where no proof of negligence or no express
provision to restore the surface exists, no liability exists.22 Further, where
the injury to the property caused by a mineral owner's operations
13 Id. at *4.
14 Id.
is Id.
16 Id. at * 1.
17 Id.
18 Id. at *2.
19 Id. at * 1-*2.
20 Id. at *3-*8.
21 Warren Petroleum Corp. v. Monzingo, 304 S.W.2d 362 (1957).
22 Id.
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exceeds the diminution in fair market value of the property, the
diminution in fair market value of that property is the proper measure to
be applied.' In sum, Texas courts have taken on one hand, but given on
the other.
IV. Arkansas
Arkansas, like Texas, is considered an accommodation doctrine
state. In 1974, the Arkansas Supreme Court considered the case of
Diamond Shamrock Corporation v. Phillips. There, the Arkansas Oil
and Gas Commission designated 640 acres as a unit for the purpose of
exploring for natural gas." The Phillips owned eighty acres within that
unit, upon which they intended to build their retirement home. The
Commission's Drder provided that the drilling site should be located at
the discretion of those who proposed to drill.2 7 Despite notices and
assurances to the contrary and discussions regarding their building plans,
Diamond Shamrock ultimately drilled a well on the very location of the
Phillips' proposed home site." The Arkansas Supreme Court ultimately
agreed with the trial court's finding that Diamond Shamrock acted
unreasonably in its placement of the well." Acknowledging the broad
rights of the mineral owner to use the surface as necessary to access the
minerals thereurider, the Court tempered that rule, quoting language from
the Getty case:
Another case which is very persuasive is Getty Oil Co. v. Jones.
That case refers to 'the reasonable usage of the surface. . . .' The
court said 'where there is an existing use by the surface owner
which would otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under
the established practices in the industry there are alternatives
available to the lessee whereby the minerals can be recovered, the
rules of reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of
an alternative by the lessee.'3 o
In addition to the indirect adoption of the accommodation doctrine,
it is also worth rioting that the court here went beyond an existing use by
the surface owner and recognized the accommodation of a proposed use
by the surface owner. It is this type of use and possible accommodation
that will be detated more heavily in the upcoming years as exploration
23 North Ridge Corp. v. Walraven, 957 S.W.2d 116 (Tex.App.-Eastland,1997).
24 511 S.W.2d 160 (1974).
25 Id. at 161.
26 Id
27 Id.
28 Id. at 161-62.
29 Id. at 163-64.
3o Id. at 163.
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and production continues its encroachment on "civilization," or vice
versa (depending on your perspective).
On the issue of surface restoration, Arkansas, much like Louisiana,
recognizes a duty to restore the surface, holding "that the duty to restore
the surface, as nearly as practicable, to the same condition as it was
before drilling is implied in the lease agreement."3 Justifying its
decision, the court explained that "[t]o hold otherwise would allow the
lessee to continue to occupy the surface, without change, after the lease
has ended. This would constitute an unreasonable surface use, and no
rule is more firmly established in oil and gas law than the rule that the
lessee is limited to a use of the surface which is reasonable."" Sixteen
years later, the Arkansas Supreme Court further determined that the duty
of restoration runs with the lease, and the assignee of an oil and gas lease
"should be held to have known that is was taking on the duty to restore
any existing surface damage."3 3
V. Mississippi
In contrast to Texas and Arkansas, Mississippi does not provide
surface owners with the same protections. In granting a motion for
summary judgment by an exploration company, Judge Bramlette of the
Southern District of Mississippi reviewed the state's law on these issues.
Quoting the Mississippi Supreme Court case of Union Producing
Company v. Pittman, the court focused on rights due the owner of the
mineral rights:
[I]n the absence of further rights expressly conveyed or reserved,
the rights of owners of minerals are limited to so much of the
surface and use thereof as is reasonably necessary to properly mine
and carry away the minerals. These rights are also subject to the
limitations that the mineral owner does not use the surface in such a
way as unnecessarily to destroy or injure it. The right to remove
minerals by the usual or customary method of mining exists, even
though the surface of the ground may be wholly destroyed as a
result thereof. The owner of the surface and the owner of the
minerals should have due regard for each other and should exercise
that degree of care and use which is a just consideration for the
rights of the other. The owner of the surface of the land has the right
to enjoy the land free from annoyance, except as reasonably arises
from the opening, exploitation, mining, and marketing of the
31 Bonds v. Sanchez-O'Brien Oil and Gas Co., 715 S.W.2d 444,446 (Ark. 1986).
32 Id
3 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Murphy Exploration & Prod. Co., 151 S.W.3d 306, 333-34
(2004).
- 186-
minerals. The mineral owner on the other hand is not limited by the
fact that his acts may cause inconvenience to the surface owner."4
With the Pittman decision as a background, the Abraham Court
limited the damages that the surface owners could recover:
[T]he [surface owners] cannot recover for loss of use or diminution
of value of their land with regard to their plans to develop a
subdivision. Nor may they recover damages for the location of the
well, drilling pad, or pipeline, without any evidence that the location
was unreasonable. They may, however, recover damages if [the
exploration company] unnecessarily and unreasonably damaged the
surface, oi used more of the surface than was reasonably necessary
to the mining operations.
Accordingly, in contrast to the accommodation states, Mississippi still
recognizes the dominance of the mineral estate over the surface.
In concert with its perspective on the superiority of the mineral
estate, Mississippi also limits recovery for surface damages by limiting
these types of damages with the prudent operator standard." Under this
standard, "the mineral lessee will be liable to the surface owner for
damages if the lessee wantonly or negligently destroys the land or uses
more land than is reasonably necessary for its mineral exploration and
production operations.""
VI. Oklahoma
In contrast to the states previously discussed, Oklahoma has statutes
governing surface damages when there is a severed mineral estate.
Except in specific situations, an operator is required to provide the
surface owner with written notice of his intent to drill, together with a
designation of "he proposed location and approximate date the operator
intends to commence work. The statute then imposes a duty on the
operator to engage in good faith negotiations to reach an agreement
regarding the determination of surface damages. If no agreement is
reached, the mineral owner, prior to beginning operations, must petition
the appropriate district court for the appointment of appraisers who make
recommendations concerning the damages that will have to be paid. The
parties then are entitled to litigate the issues through to jury trial - all
prior to operations beginning on the property. In general, the surface
34 Abraham v. Sklar Exploration Co., L.L.C., 408 F. Supp. 2d 244, (S.D. Miss. 2005)
(quoting Union Pr'ducing Company v. Pittman, 146 So. 2d 553, 555 (1962)).
3s See EOG Resources, Inc. v. Turner, 908 So. 2d 848, 854 (Miss. Ct. App. 2005).
36 Id. (citing Pittman, 146 So. 2d at 555).
" See OKLA. SIAT. tit. 52, §§ 318.2-318.9.
38 OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 318.3.
39 Id
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owner's damages are limited to diminution in value (although common
law torts and nuisance claims are also available with other damages
theories). However, if a party pursues to jury trial and recovers less than
the appraisers' award, then all attorneys' fees and costs must be assessed
against that party.
VII Why Should Louisiana Care?
The foregoing provides the backdrop for a discussion of what
Louisiana (and other states) have to learn from their neighbors' struggles
with the same issues that work their easy through Louisiana's courts and
legislature. The oral presentation of this topic focuses on many of these
common issues and how and why they should or should not be handled
in the same ways by Louisiana. The following are some of those issues:
Off-Site Accommodation - is there any requirement for an operator
to accommodate off-site and, if so, in what circumstances? How
will Louisiana courts deal with these issues?
Off-Unit Accommodation?
Barnett Shale issues.
Should Louisiana pursue a surface damages act?
13031;93- CQCQ~CQCQ
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